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Abstract: The terrain of private-land conservation dealmaking is shifting. As the number of acres 18 
of private land protected for conservation increases, our understanding of what it means for a 19 
property to be “conserved” is shifting. We examined 269 conservation easements and conducted 20 
73 interviews with land conservation organizations to investigate changes in private-land 21 
conservation in the United States. We hypothesized that since 2000, conservation easements 22 
have become more complex but less restrictive. Our analysis reveals shifts in what it means for 23 
private land to be “conserved.” We found that conservation easements have indeed become more 24 
complex, with more purposes and terms after 2000 compared to conservation easements 25 
recorded before 2000. However, changes in restrictiveness of conservation easements varied by 26 
land use. Mining and waste dumping were less likely to be allowed after 2000, but new 27 
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residences and structures were twice as likely to be allowed. We found a shift toward allowing 28 
some bounded timber harvest and grazing, and a decline in terms that entirely allow or prohibit 29 
these working land uses. Interviews revealed staff perceptions of reasons for these changes. Our 30 
analysis suggests that “used” landscapes are increasingly important for conservation but that 31 
conserving these properties stretches the limits of simple, perpetual policy tools and requires 32 
increasingly complex and contingent agreements. 33 
Highlights: 34 
 Conservation easement deeds are more complex with more complicated land use terms 35 
 Increased conservation on working land alters the private conservation landscape 36 
 Using partial-property tools for private land conservation is limited 37 
Keywords: Conservation easements, land trusts, nonprofit organizations, private-land 38 
conservation, property rights  39 
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 47 
1. INTRODUCTION 48 
Land conservation can prevent development and enhance environmental management and 49 
recreation. Conservation easements are part of the global trend toward decentralized 50 
environmental governance in which nonprofit and government entities negotiate standards and 51 
enforce rules (Owley, 2013). Internationally, public agencies and nonprofit organizations have 52 
sought ways to augment land protection and are increasingly relying on conservation easements 53 
(CEs). As CEs become increasingly important for land conservation, it is helpful to understand 54 
how the tool is evolving (Merenlender et al., 2004). Since they are perpetual restrictions on land 55 
based on today’s understanding and preferences, CEs tend to remain fixed once established with 56 
subsequent transactions reflecting organizational learning and changing conservation contexts 57 
(Rissman, 2011). Organizations and landowners are learning from experience and responding to 58 
changing institutional contexts for conservation, so CEs established in the 1980s and 1990s may 59 
be substantially different from those of more recent decades. 60 
We examined 269 conservation easements from six U.S. states to investigate differences 61 
between older and more recent CEs and conducted 73 interviews with staff of organizations 62 
holding these CEs. The CE and interview data present a compelling story of change within 63 
private-land conservation. Scholars and practitioners have noted increasing sophistication of CEs 64 
(Boyd et al., 1999). Yet, the trends and contours of these changes have not been examined 65 
systemically. Understanding how CEs are changing provides important information to land 66 
conservation stakeholders considering how to conserve land.  67 
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1.1 Conservation Easements 68 
CEs are nonpossessory rights in land with a conservation purpose. The holder of a CE is a 69 
government agency, nonprofit land trust, or Native American tribe with a nonpossessory right in 70 
another person or entity’s real property. Such rights are generally negative, prohibiting the 71 
landowner from doing something she would have otherwise been able to do. CEs can also 72 
contain affirmative rights, giving the CE holder the right to do something the landowner could 73 
have otherwise prohibited. Whether negative or affirmative, the goal of the restriction is to yield 74 
a conservation benefit (NCCUSL, 2007). CEs vary widely in purposes, restrictions, and the size 75 
and landscape context of conserved properties. Common examples of CE terms include 76 
prohibitions on development, limitations on activities in wetlands, and rules regarding forestry 77 
and agricultural practices.  78 
The CE tool has evolved significantly. Historically, courts did not approve of CEs, 79 
disfavoring long-term restrictions on land that made transfers and negotiations regarding land 80 
uses more cumbersome. Conservationists grew dissatisfied with the limitations of public land 81 
conservation and land-use regulation and began to look for additional mechanisms to protect 82 
environmental amenities (Owley, 2006). CEs appeared a logical outgrowth of traditional 83 
property agreements like easements and real covenants that restrict a landowner’s behavior on 84 
her own land or permit a right holder to do something on the land (like trespassing) that the 85 
landowner would otherwise have been able to prohibit. CEs needed new legal foundations due to 86 
inherent legal conflicts with traditional real estate mechanisms (that limited permissible holders 87 
and purposes of servitudes) and the desires of conservationists (Cheever, 1996). Therefore, 88 
beginning in earnest in the 1970s and increasing after a 1981 Uniform Act, U.S. states enacted 89 
CE statutes validating the use of such agreements and creating foundations for their enforcement. 90 
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The CE deduction was added to the U.S. federal tax code in 1980, enabling a charitable tax 91 
deduction for donated CEs and estate tax benefits. All fifty states, Washington D.C., Puerto Rico, 92 
and the Virgin Islands now have CE statutes. Other nations have been following this model, and 93 
we now see CE-like structures in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Kenya, Costa Rica and 94 
Mexico (Di Leva, 2002; Jacobs, 2014; Korngold, 2010; Rissman et al., 2014). There are also 95 
proposals for development elsewhere, including Papua New Guinea and Chile (Root-Bernstein et 96 
al., 2013; Stolton et al., 2014; Telesetsky, 2001).   97 
The growth in CEs in the U.S. has been driven by the growth of the land trust movement and 98 
the infusion of public funding from ballot initiatives and the U.S. Farm Bill. The number of land 99 
trusts has grown at an incredible rate. In 1950, there were only 53 land trusts, and in 2011 there 100 
were over 1,700 (McLaughlin, 2004). The 2010 Land Trust Alliance’s Census tallied the total 101 
hectares of CEs held by land trusts at over 19 million (Chang, 2011). In 2000, there were only 102 
9.3 million hectares held by state, local, and national land trusts. This number does not include 103 
the millions of additional hectares held by government agencies.  104 
The land trust movement and the use of CEs matured between the 1980s and 2010s. The 105 
Land Trust Alliance first published The Conservation Easement Handbook in 1988 and the 106 
Standards and Practices Guidebook in 1993. Farm Bill funding became available for land-trust-107 
held CEs in 2002 (Alliance, 2013). By the early 2000s, CEs were subject to heightened 108 
academic, media, and governmental scrutiny. Senate Finance Committee and IRS investigations 109 
began in 2003, resulting in hundreds of CE audits. The Land Trust Accreditation Commission 110 
was created in 2006 to set national organizational standards. 111 
We expected to see two trends in CE terms: increasing complexity and declining 112 
restrictiveness of private land use. Our research group has experience working with CEs as 113 
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attorneys, academic researchers, and board members of land trusts. This experience suggests that 114 
CEs are getting longer and more complicated. At the same time, however, CEs appear to be 115 
allowing more development and landowner uses of the conserved property. We conducted a 116 
survey of CE documents and interviews with CE holders to test our hypotheses and quantify 117 
these trends, comparing CEs created before and after 2000. 118 
1.2 Hypothesis 1: Conservation easements have increased in complexity. 119 
We expected to find that CEs increased in complexity, with newer CEs including more 120 
purposes and terms. Contract theory, diffusion of innovation, and organizational learning suggest 121 
an increase in complexity over time (Argyres et al., 2007; Gray, 1973; Vanneste and Puranam, 122 
2008). CEs evolved in conjunction with changes in state and federal law, funder requirements, 123 
and increased public scrutiny. As land trusts and government agencies mature and CE use 124 
increases, holders are more likely to be repeat participants. With this experience and the growth 125 
in the number of attorneys working with CEs, we expect organizations to anticipate more 126 
potentialities and negotiate for more terms, seeking to maximize the likelihood of achieving their 127 
conservation goals. We also expect that donated CEs might be less complex than purchased or 128 
partially-purchased CEs (Rissman, 2010). CEs are also more likely to be part of mitigation for 129 
development or other habitat destruction in which the expectation for defined rules and duties is 130 
higher (Owley, 2011). Larger properties may also require greater complexity in CE terms. 131 
An increase in complexity of conservation easements would be consistent with trends seen in 132 
other types of contractual documents. Attorneys often seek to improve contract completeness by 133 
adding contingency planning or by increasing contract details (Argyres et al., 2007) (Crocker and 134 
Reynolds, 1993). As parties to contracts learn about potential outcomes through personal 135 
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experience, court cases, and news reports, they add contract language regarding such events. 136 
Though characterized as deed restrictions, CEs are similar to contracts, are often referred to as 137 
contracts (Tegene et al., 1999), and courts use contract rules when interpreting them (Haines, 138 
2012).  139 
Innovative terms may also have diffused through conservation organizations. Diffusion of 140 
innovation occurs where there is “communication of a new idea in a social system over time” 141 
(Gray, 1973). Increased levels of interaction though social media likely magnify this effect. For 142 
example, increased use of model CEs, publications like the Conservation Easement Handbook or 143 
the Land Trust Alliance’s Standards and Practices, or discussions on the Land Trust Alliance 144 
listservs enable drafters to easily adopt terms and techniques used by others. It is also possible 145 
that there is a bandwagon effect (Asch, 1955) for CE terms. That is, the probability of any holder 146 
adopting a particular term increases with the proportion of holders who has already done so 147 
(Colman, 2012).  148 
Organizational learning theory supports the hypothesis of increasing complexity. 149 
Organizational learning is a change in an organization’s practices based on experience (Argote, 150 
2013). As land trusts enter into more conservation easements, staff members change and improve 151 
their conservation easements based on their earlier transactions and in reaction to conflicts that 152 
have arisen with landowners. Repeated interactions enable drafters to capture more 153 
contingencies. Changes are more frequently driven by actual experiences rather than increased 154 
ability to predict potential future occurrences (Mayer and Argyres, 2004). It is impossible to 155 
foresee all contingencies, and staff identify important terms that were left out of prior CEs. For 156 
example, if land trusts have problems with landowners dumping trash, they are likely to add 157 
provisions on waste dumping to future CEs. Incorporating new CE terms guards against 158 
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organizational forgetting and may leave terms in subsequent CEs long after individual staff 159 
members have forgotten why the terms first appeared (Argote, 1999). 160 
1.3. Hypothesis 2: Conservation easements have decreased in restrictiveness. 161 
While CE documents may become increasingly complex, the restrictions on landowners may 162 
be lessening.1 We hypothesized that recent CEs would allow landowners to exercise more land-163 
use rights for a few reasons. The earliest CEs preserved key landmarks or were viewed as 164 
“forever wild” CEs that did not allow substantial use or development of those properties (Jacobs, 165 
2014). CEs are now used in more contexts and on larger properties. They may be more likely to 166 
be part of a large-scale suburban development, in urban areas, or on a golf course. To attract new 167 
landowners and enable a growing conservation land base, CEs may also increasingly encumber 168 
residential properties or large working lands with active farming, grazing, and timber harvesting. 169 
In these cases, landowners typically retain rights to conduct activities on the lands. Changes in 170 
funding and conservation organization priorities could also contribute to decreased restrictions 171 
on land use. One trend that may run counter to this hypothesis is that donated CEs may contain 172 
fewer restrictions than purchased or other CEs, since landowners typically receive less financial 173 
incentive for a donated CE. Purchased CEs have increased with funding from the Farm Bill and 174 
voter-approved bond initiatives. 175 
2. METHODS 176 
We examined 269 CEs from six states in the U.S. (California, Colorado, Indiana, New York, 177 
South Carolina, and Wisconsin). We collected the CEs through a distributed graduate seminar 178 
                                                 
1 In fact, the most restrictive development term could be extremely short: “No Development Anywhere on the 
Property.” When the landowners have more rights, the provisions get longer, detailing where development may occur, 
what form it will take, and what approval process is required. 
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conducted among six universities in Spring 2011 (Ref Redacted). To include a wide range of 179 
land conservation organizations and CEs, we selected 63 land trusts and governmental holders 180 
from 28 regions across the six states. We then acquired four CEs from each organization: the 181 
oldest and newest CEs, a middle CE from the median year between the oldest and newest CE, 182 
and the largest CE (by area) held by the organization in the study region. If the largest CE was 183 
also the oldest, middle, or newest, the second largest CE was selected. We selected these CEs to 184 
maximize the variation in terms within each organization. 185 
We coded the CEs by categorizing their purposes, land-use terms, and procedural terms. To 186 
analyze how CEs have changed, we divided the CEs into two groups: those recorded before 2000 187 
(“before 2000” n=76) and those recorded from 2000-2011 (“after 2000” n=193). We split the 188 
dataset at 2000 because the use of CEs increased dramatically by 2000. By that date, 189 
conservation organizations had access to a variety of CE drafting resources including books, 190 
conferences, and reports. Additionally, in the early 2000s funding for CEs grew with federal 191 
programs like the Farm Bill and local bond initiatives. By the early 2000s, CEs were subject to 192 
heightened academic, media, and governmental scrutiny. With some experience under their belts, 193 
drafters were incorporating lessons from earlier projects. 194 
Our sample had similar dominant land cover, state, and type of holder (government or NGO), 195 
or type of landowner (private, NGO, or government) before and after 2000 (Appendix Table 1). 196 
Our sample had fewer small properties and donated CEs after 2000. For this reason, we control 197 
for property size and whether the CE was donated in all multivariate analyses. 198 
To test our first hypothesis of an increase in complexity, we first examined whether the number 199 
of purposes was higher after 2000 by conducting a multiple linear regression (all analyses in IBM 200 
SPSS v.22) of the number of purposes in each CE with independent variables year (before or after 201 
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2000), property size (larger or smaller than 500 acres), and whether the CE was donated (yes/no), 202 
and a size*year interaction term. The size*year interaction term was not significant, so it was 203 
removed from the final model. We conducted chi-squared analyses of whether specific purpose 204 
clauses and types of purposes were more or less common after 2000. 205 
Second, we tracked the presence of 17 land-use and 5 procedural CE terms. We developed this 206 
list of provisions based on the Land Trust Alliance’s Conservation Easement Handbook and our 207 
previous experience with CEs. We created a land use complexity metric that summed the number 208 
of land uses that each CE mentioned (including provisions to restrict or permit the land use), out 209 
of 17 land use categories. We hypothesized that CEs after 2000 would mention more land uses 210 
than CEs before 2000, which we tested with the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test. We used 211 
the nonparametric test here because the complexity metric sums many diverse types of easement 212 
terms. We tested change in presence of five procedural terms (termination, condemnation, Acts of 213 
God, amendment, dispute resolution) before and after 2000 with chi-squared analysis.  214 
Our second hypothesis considered whether later CEs are less likely to restrict landowners’ 215 
private land uses. When examining CE terms to test this hypothesis, we looked for both the 216 
presence of terms and their meaning. For example, instead of just asking whether the CE had a 217 
term about invasive species, we examined what that term said and what level of control the CE 218 
purported to exert over landowner action. We examined whether CEs became more restrictive 219 
through chi-squared analysis of land-use restrictions. 220 
We compared development terms in CEs before and after 2000 with multinomial logistic 221 
regression (n=269), controlling for property size, working land purpose (including forestry, 222 
grazing, or agriculture), and whether the CE was donated. Development restrictions were divided 223 
into three categories: no new development; one residence, agricultural building, cabins, or other 224 
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structures; and two or more new residences allowed. The final model regressed development terms 225 
with year (before or after 2000), size of property (smaller or larger than 500 acres), and whether 226 
the CE included a working land purpose. We initially included a year*size interaction term and 227 
whether the CE was donated, but these variables were not significant and were removed from the 228 
final model to minimize AIC.  229 
We also developed multinomial logistic regressions to examine whether timber harvest 230 
grazing terms were more or less restrictive after 2000. We classified the dominant land cover of 231 
each CE based on GIS maps, Google Earth, and document descriptions. We examined harvest 232 
terms on forested CEs (126) and grazing terms on grass/shrub CEs (108). Properties with a 233 
dominant land cover of wetland (31) or other (4) were excluded. For forest properties, we 234 
examined whether CE terms allowed any timber harvest, some timber harvest (with restrictions 235 
in the CE or an associated management plan), or no timber harvest were more or less common 236 
after 2000, controlling for property size, working land purpose, and whether the CE was donated 237 
(n=126). Property size, a size*year interaction term, and donated were not significant and were 238 
removed from the final model due to selection to minimize AIC. For grass/shrub properties, we 239 
examined whether CE terms that allowed any grazing, some grazing (with restrictions in the CE 240 
or an associated management plan), or no grazing were more or less common after 2000, 241 
controlling for property size, working land purpose, and whether the CE was donated (n=108). A 242 
size*year interaction term and donated were included in the preliminary grazing terms model but 243 
were removed because they were not significant and removing them minimized AIC.  244 
We conducted 73 structured interviews based on a standard questionnaire with staff from 63 245 
land trusts or government agencies. These structured interviews were conducted by phone (n=49), 246 
in person (n=22), or through written email correspondence when this was preferred by 247 
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organizational staff (n=2). We asked staff involved with CEs to describe the organization’s 248 
approach to drafting CE language and how that approach has changed over time. We inductively 249 
coded open-ended questions (Boyatzis, 1998) and identified sixteen recurring themes. 250 
3. RESULTS 251 
3.1. Complexity  252 
Multiple analyses support the hypothesis of an increase in CE complexity. First, we found an 253 
increase in the number of CE purposes (Fig. 1). CEs since 2000 had an average of 7.8 purposes, 254 
compared to 5.4 purposes before 2000. A multiple linear regression found that CEs after 2000 had 255 
more purposes (standardized ß=0.392, t=6.247, p<0.001) and larger CEs over 500 acres had more 256 
purposes (standardized ß=0.195, t=3.482, p=0.001), while donated CEs (standardized ß=-0.195, 257 
t=-3.345, p=0.001) had fewer purposes (full model adjusted r2=0.184, F=21.184, p<0.001). CEs 258 
created after 2000 were more likely to have specific purposes with lists of specific conservation 259 
values, species and natural communities, and goals to protect working land uses like forestry, 260 
grazing, or farming (Appendix Table 2). 261 
  262 
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Figure 1.  Conservation easements created after 2000 have more purposes than those created before 263 
2000. 264 
 265 
The complexity of land-use provisions increased (Fig. 2). CEs after 2000 had more terms 266 
regarding land-use restrictions, with a mean of 12.5 land-use terms after 2000, compared with 10.2 267 
terms before 2000 (Mann-Whitney U Test, n=269, z=-5.49, p<0.001, two-sided). The land-use 268 
complexity metric summed the land uses in Table 1. 269 
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Figure 2. The complexity of land-use terms in conservation easements is higher after 2000. 270 
 271 
Table 1. Seventeen land-use terms included in the land-use complexity metric. 272 
Land-Use Terms 
Percentage 
of CEs 
Before 2000 
(n=76) 
containing 
the term 
Percentage 
of CEs After 
2000 (n=193) 
containing 
the term 
Increase 
in 
percentage 
New Structures, Buildings, or Roads Mentioned 94.7% 99.0% 4.3% 
Alteration of Land Mentioned 84.2% 84.5% 0.3% 
Waste Dumping Mentioned 81.6% 94.3% 12.7% 
Public Access Mentioned 81.6% 91.7% 10.1% 
Timber Harvest Mentioned 76.3% 91.2% 14.9% 
Alteration of Water Courses Mentioned 72.4% 82.9% 10.5% 
Commercial Recreation Mentioned 71.1% 82.8% 11.7% 
Mining Mentioned 69.0% 91.9% 22.9% 
Subdivision of the Property Mentioned 64.5% 85.0% 20.5% 
Farming Mentioned 64.5% 83.4% 18.9% 
Livestock Grazing Mentioned 56.6% 76.7% 20.1% 
Invasive Species Mentioned  56.6% 68.4% 11.8% 
Wildlife Mentioned 39.2% 56.5% 17.3% 
Water Rights Mentioned 36.6% 53.2% 16.6% 
Management Plan Mentioned 31.0% 56.8% 25.8% 
Prescribed Fire Mentioned 21.1% 34.2% 13.1% 
Climate Change Mentioned  1.3% 3.6% 2.3% 
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Procedural clauses like Acts of God, amendment, and dispute resolution increased over time 273 
(Table 2). Termination and condemnation provisions, which are generally common, did not change 274 
in frequency.  275 
Table 2. Percent of CEs with each procedural clause before and after 2000. 276 
Procedural Terms χ2 P- 
value 
Before 2000 
(n=76) 
After 2000 
(n=193) 
Termination Provision 0.146 0.702 74.3% 76.6% 
Condemnation Provision 0.017 0.895 69.3% 70.2% 
Acts of God Provision 11.395 0.001 45.3% 67.7% 
Amendment Provision 30.514 <0.001 42.1% 77.2% 
Dispute Resolution Provision 4.870 0.027 23.7% 37.8% 
 277 
3.2. Restrictiveness 278 
Trends in land-use restrictions differed by land-use. Waste dumping and mining were more 279 
likely to be prohibited after 2000 while other land-use terms showed no significant change 280 
(Table 3).  281 
Table 3. Percent of CEs with each land-use restriction before and after 2000 (n=269).  282 
Land-Use Restrictions χ2 P- 
value 
Before 
2000 
(n=76) 
After 2000 
(n=193) 
Alteration of Land Restricted 0.186 0.666 77.6% 75.1% 
Waste Dumping Restricted 9.301 0.002 81.6% 93.8% 
Alteration of Water Courses Restricted 3.167 0.075 63.2% 74.1% 
Mining Prohibited 4.613 0.032 49.3% 64.0% 
Public Access Allowed 0.465 0.495 26.3% 22.4% 
Commercial Recreation Prohibited 0.041 0.839 28.9% 30.2% 
Landowner Plantings Restricted or 
Landowner Required to Manage 
Invasive Species  
3.292 0.070 22.4% 33.7% 
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CEs were more likely to allow development after 2000 (Fig. 3a). CEs have become twice as 283 
likely to allow one residence or other structures (including agricultural buildings, sheds or 284 
cabins) and 2.5 times more likely to allow two or more residences than no development (odds 285 
ratios in Table 4).  286 
Figure 3. Since 2000, conservation easements have shifted to allowing more development (2a, 287 
n=269), some timber harvesting (2b, forested properties n=126) and some grazing (2c, 288 
grass/shrub properties n=108). 289 
 290 
Interestingly, half (52%) of South Carolina’s CEs allowed for two or more residences, 291 
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compared to only 9% to 27% of CEs in each of the other five states.  292 
Table 4. Results of a multinomial logistic regression indicating the effects of size, year, and 293 
working land purpose on the likelihood of allowing development (reference category is no 294 
development allowed). 295 
 2+ residences vs No development 
1 residence or other 
structures vs No 
development 
 B p-value 
Odds 
ratio 
B 
p-
value 
Odds 
ratio 
Year (after 2000) 0.916 0.028 2.499 0.676 0.046 1.965 
Working land purpose 1.759 <0.001 5.804 1.667 <0.001 5.294 
Property size (>500 ac) 1.755 <0.001 5.786 0.87 0.016 2.388 
Intercept -2.127 <0.001   -0.847 0.006   
N 269 
χ2 68.854 
Df 6 
p-value <0.001 
Goodness of Fit, 
Pearson χ2=11.386, df=8, p=0.183 
Pseudo R-squared, Cox 
and Snell 0.226 
% Predicted Correctly 54% 
 296 
Timber harvest and grazing terms experienced a shift toward the middle. That is, timber 297 
harvests are less likely to be prohibited and more likely to be explicitly permitted with some 298 
restrictions in the CE or a management plan after 2000 (Fig. 3b). Before 2000, 54% of forested 299 
CEs did not allow harvest, compared to only 30% of forested CEs after 2000. CE terms that 300 
allowed harvest with some restrictions increased from 30% of forested CEs before 2000 to 61% 301 
after 2000, while terms that allowed any unrestricted harvest or were silent on harvest declined 302 
from 16% before 2000 to 10% after 2000. The shift from no harvest to some harvest with 303 
restrictions was significant in the multinomial logistic regression that controlled for working land 304 
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purpose (Appendix Table 3). The odds ratios indicated that CEs were 3 times more likely to 305 
allow some harvest with restrictions than no harvest (1/odds ratio of 0.33=3.03) or any 306 
unrestricted harvest (1/odds ratio of 0.31=3.23) after 2000. 307 
Grazing terms also provided some evidence of a shift to the middle, meaning that fewer 308 
properties prohibited grazing outright and fewer properties allowed it without restriction after 309 
2000 (Fig. 3c). Before 2000, only 32% of grass/shrub CEs include some restrictions on grazing 310 
in the CE or management plan, whereas 50% of those after 2000 included some restrictions. The 311 
percent of CEs with no grazing restrictions declined from 61% to 39%. No grazing is allowed in 312 
7% of CEs grass/shrub CEs before 2000 and 11% after 2000. Grazing terms had a marginally-313 
significant shift from any harvest allowed to some harvest allowed with restrictions, once 314 
property size and working land purpose were controlled for in the model (Appendix Table 4). 315 
3.3. Perceived changes in CE terms 316 
Based on inductive coding, we identified recurring themes in response to questions asking 317 
whether an organization’s approach to drafting CEs had changed, and if so, how and why it 318 
changed (Table 5). The majority of interviewees (85%) stated that the organization had changed 319 
its approach to drafting. An additional two interviewees initially stated that the approach had not 320 
changed, but then described changes (increasing the percent of interviewees discussing changes 321 
to 88%). While most described a shift toward complexity, we also heard that some organizations 322 
are starting to reign in the complexity of CEs in favor of simple, clear terms. We heard 323 
conflicting views about whether recent CEs are more or less restrictive of private land uses. 324 
  325 
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Table 5. Interview responses from organization staff describing types of change in conservation 326 
easement (CE) drafting (n=73). 327 
Change to CE 
drafting 
approach 
# of 
interviewees  
Representative statements or examples from interviews 
CEs are more 
specific, detailed 
27 “Much longer and more detailed over time, with much 
more professional drafting”  
Influence of a 
particular staff  
15 “Documents changed based on the attorney involved.” 
Use of model 
CE 
14 Organizations developed templates   
Less restrictive  12 “Whenever possible we get away from micromanagement 
type issues on the property, for instance trying to not be 
involved in day-to-day management type issues….” 
Shift in 
organization 
focus  
8 The organization was more preservationist focused before, 
but now has more “working land easements.” 
Reaction to IRS 
or case law 
8 “Due to IRS ranks becoming stricter, easements must 
become more sophisticated and detailed to meet the 
regulations.” 
Organization 
looked to LTA  
7 “Basically we’ve followed the changes in the Land Trust 
Alliance’s approach to easement drafting.” 
Easier to enforce 
or monitor 
6 “[We] are using more terms that are monitorable and 
enforceable and trying to provide flexibility for adaptive 
management.” 
Less specific 5 “The language used to be too specific” 
Simpler 4 Desire to make the language “clearer” and “more simple” 
More 
prohibitions 
4 “… much easier to constrain an activity than it is to 
prescribe one.” Constraints can be documented and 
tracked.  
 328 
4. DISCUSSION 329 
4.1. Hypothesis 1: Increasing Complexity 330 
Consistent with our expectations, CEs have become more complex and detailed. Our analysis 331 
of CE documents and interviews with conservation practitioners shows how CEs are increasing 332 
in complexity. This increase in complexity likely has many sources, including repeat players in 333 
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negotiations, contingency planning, diffusion of innovation, organizational learning, and the 334 
increased prominence of purchased CEs on large properties with working land uses.   335 
4.1.1. Purposes  336 
Within our sample, the number and specificity of purposes increased over time. These more 337 
diverse purposes may be an effort to ensure compliance with state and federal law as parties 338 
mirror the language that appears in statutes. CE purposes may also respond to judicial action. For 339 
example, conservationists worry about the implications of the doctrine of changed conditions, 340 
which suggests that when circumstances change the landscape such that purposes can no longer 341 
be fulfilled, CEs will terminate (Jay, 2012). Adding purposes to a CE could then serve as a 342 
backstop: if one purpose becomes impossible to fulfill, the CE need not face termination if 343 
another purpose can be met. Some holders may seek to expand the number of purposes because 344 
most CEs prohibit any actions inconsistent with the CE’s purposes. An expansion of purposes 345 
then can serve as a legal hook to later prevent uncontemplated landowner action. Such language 346 
has been used to prevent erecting cellphone towers (T-Mobile Northeast v. Town of Islip 347 
(2012c)) and filling in sinkholes (The Nature Conservancy v. Sims,(2012a)), and may serve as a 348 
way to prohibit hydrofracking (Stockport Mountain Corp. v. Norcross Wildlife 349 
Foundation(2012b)). 350 
However, an increasing number of purposes could cause trouble for both enforcement and 351 
management of protected lands. Most CEs did not identify dominant purposes. Enforcement 352 
concerns arise when holders and courts are faced with multiple conflicting mandates without an 353 
indication of which might take precedence. Generally, multiple purposes can create confusion for 354 
land managers (Fischman, 2002). Purposes may become incompatible, and individual land-use 355 
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restrictions and permissions may conflict with one or more purposes.  356 
4.1.2. Land-Use Terms  357 
CEs since 2000 are likely to mention more land-use terms such as for dumping waste, 358 
mining, and subdivision of the property. Land-use terms are likely to increase for some of the 359 
same reasons as purposes. Increased litigation and scrutiny by the IRS as well as involvement by 360 
other government entities like state attorneys general may also lead drafters to add language 361 
clarifying rights and responsibilities. Additionally, as CEs cover larger and more varied 362 
properties in more circumstances (e.g., in development schemes or in working landscapes), there 363 
may be a greater need to explain permitted and prohibited land uses. 364 
One of the biggest increases was in management plans, which is an intriguing phenomenon. 365 
On one hand it represents an acknowledgement of both the need to accommodate change and the 366 
potential need for active land management (Rissman et al., 2014). On the other hand, 367 
management plans can provide an avenue for delaying controversial decisions regarding CE 368 
terms as items eluding agreement can be pushed off for consideration another day and hidden 369 
from public review (Rissman et al., 2013).  370 
4.1.3. Procedural Clauses 371 
Later CEs were more likely to contain procedural boilerplate clauses regarding Acts of God, 372 
dispute resolution, and amendment. Interviews indicated that sometimes these new clauses 373 
appeared when new staff members or outside attorneys began drafting the documents. This may 374 
have the impact of leaving terms in subsequent CEs with individual staff members no longer 375 
certain of their origin (Argote, 1999).The largest increase was in amendment clauses, which is 376 
particularly noteworthy as it accompanies a heated debate within the conservation community 377 
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about the role of amendments. Some have argued that perpetual agreements should not be 378 
amended and this generally appears to be the view of the IRS (Bjork v. Draper (2010)). 379 
However, most conservationists acknowledge that it is unrealistic and impractical to have long-380 
term agreements without mechanisms for change. The Land Trust Alliance recommends 381 
including amendment clauses and having amendment policies (Alliance, 2004) and accreditation 382 
requires it (Commission, 2014). This trend may help explain the increased presence of dispute 383 
resolution and Acts of God clauses. We may also be starting to see some backlash or course 384 
correction in response to the increasing complexity of CE terms in which organizations are 385 
focusing more on designing decision-making processes for settling CE disputes.  386 
4.2. Hypothesis 2: Decreasing Restrictiveness 387 
We hypothesized that land use terms have become less restrictive, but the trends we found 388 
are more complex. Restrictions on development have declined, and CEs created after 2000 are 389 
twice as likely to allow at least one or two residences than CEs before 2000. However, we found 390 
a shift toward compromise for timber harvest and grazing, with a decline in complete 391 
prohibitions on timber harvest and a decline in completely unrestricted grazing. Provisions 392 
regarding waste dumping and mining tended to be more restrictive. The presence of a mining 393 
term may be influenced by federal tax regulations requiring limitations on mining for tax-394 
deductible CEs. 395 
The patterns of CE evolution reflect broader trends in conservation policy and philosophy. 396 
Earlier CEs were viewed as a close alternative to fee simple ownership in which some 397 
landowners desired or were willing to accept limited land uses on their properties. We see 398 
evidence of the shift toward conserving used landscapes and the intent to promote compatibility 399 
between natural resource production and conservation (Brunson and Huntsinger, 2008; Sayre, 400 
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2005). However at some level, increasing private land uses also suggests challenges for 401 
preventing undue private benefit and abuse of the CE tool. Meanwhile, increasing knowledge 402 
about conservation science indicates conservation benefits may be available in small slices. For 403 
example, practitioners may be more confident about allowing selective cutting of a forest parcel 404 
and still protecting some species habitat and water quality benefits. This has led to a shift toward 405 
the middle as the parties seek to compromise on the private land uses permitted on conserved 406 
properties. 407 
5. CONCLUSION 408 
CEs held a promise of being a simple low-cost alternative to fee-simple acquisition, but are 409 
becoming increasingly complex. As CEs get complex we have shown that they have become 410 
more restrictive for mining, waste dumping, and grazing, but less restrictive for development and 411 
timber harvesting. CEs are more likely to detail what landowners can and cannot do and consider 412 
more issues than they had previously. CEs are being used more often and in more contexts. 413 
Where CEs cover larger land areas, they are more likely to spell out rights and obligations and 414 
related to multiple land uses. We show that the question of what it means to conserve private 415 
land, and what balance of private and public rights and responsibilities are being codified in 416 
conservation restrictions, has changed over time. In an era of fragmented and devolved 417 
governance, nonprofit organizations and governments with considerable rulemaking autonomy 418 
are negotiating conservation terms. It is important to understand these choices and trends shaping 419 
the private-land conservation estate. 420 
 421 
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